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Commentary
By Rodney M. Confer*
Professional Tenure as a Means to
Promote Ethical Compliance in
the Civil Discovery Process
Professor Kalish suggests that a lawyer should be allowed to
sue an organization which was formerly his employer or client, but
which wrongfully discharged him for his refusal to commit an ethi-
cal violation in the organization's interest. The goal of his proposal
is to encourage attorneys to uphold the integrity of the legal sys-
tem by obeying the ethical canons of the bar, rather than to act out
of loyalty to the organization in disregard of ethical considerations.
This essay examines the proposal and its underlying premises
by putting them in a context in which such ethical violations might
occur: the civil discovery process. It is believed the analysis here
is equally applicable to other situations in which the lawyer must
decide whether to act in the best interest of an organization al-
though that interest conflicts with a rule of ethics which promotes
the integrity of the legal system.
I. ETHICAL VIOLATIONS IN THE DISCOVERY PROCESS
Professor Kalish's essay provides two illustrations of the con-
flict between the organization and the lawyer's duty to the legal
system: an attorney in a large law firm disagrees with her senior
partner over whether she may represent both parties in a divorce,
and a corporate attorney is ordered to negotiate directly with a
competitor whom the lawyer knows to be represented by legal
counsel. While these examples illustrate the point, it seems un-
likely that ethical infractions would result in these situations since
any such violation would probably be discovered by an attorney
representing the adverse party or by the court. An organization
which understood the risk of exposure would not persist in a sui-
cidal act, nor would it make sense for the organization to find a
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different attorney who would commit the violations described,
since discovery and punishment would be too likely.
In the discovery process, on the other hand, it is doubtful that
ethical violations will often come to light. Consequently, this
would seem to increase the chance that such infractions may oc-
cur. Discovery depends for its effectiveness on the good faith and
honesty of the litigants. When large organizations are involved in
litigation, requests for discovery of the contents of internal files or
records concerning the case are routinely made. The request may
be by interrogatory, motion to produce, request for admissions, or
during deposition testimony. Records are likely to be voluminous,
and painstaking search must be made to retrieve the information.
The stakes are likely to be high in contract, products liability, anti-
trust or other complex lawsuits against organizations and in which
large law firms are commonly involved. The information must be
produced, even though it is not admissible in evidence, if the re-
quest is reasonably designed to lead to discovery of admissible evi-
dence.'
If the requested information is damaging to the case, there is a
great temptation to suppress it. The adversary may suspect that it
exists, but he probably does not know. Where a great deal of mate-
rial is provided, it may be less likely that suppressed damaging
material will be missed. Moreover, it is easy to rationalize the
deed by reasoning that the other side may be doing the same thing,
the information is not really relevant, or a jury of laymen would
not understand it and place it in its proper light.2
Suppression of such information violates the rules of ethics.3 It
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (b) (1).
2. For an example of the suppression of discovery materials, see Brill, When a
Lawyer Lies, ESQUIRE Dec. 19, 1978, at 23. Mr. Brill tells how a prominent
New York attorney, who defended Kodak in an antitrust suit brought by Ber-
key Photo, withheld information in discovery. The lawyer later admitted
what he had done and served a prison sentence for contempt of court. His act
of withholding documents was used against Kodak at trial and a verdict of
$113 million was returned against the defendant. This was later reduced to
$87 million.
3. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBmrY, CANONS, DR 1-102 (A) (1978); "A
lawyer shall not:... (4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, de-
ceit, or misrepresentation. (5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice ......
DR 7-102 (A) provides:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(3) Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is re-
quired by law to reveal.
(5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.
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also deprives the adversary and society of a just result. If evidence
at trial does not square with the facts because the adversary was
not allowed to know the facts, then the dispute is never heard and
the real issue is never decided.
II. SECURING THE INTEGRITY OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Professor Kalish's goal in allowing a wrongful discharge rem-
edy to lawyers is to encourage them to act in ways which do not
undermine the legal system. Perversion of the discovery process
prevents the fair resolution of disputes between members of our
society. The role of the civil law is to do justice in a peaceful way
when disagreements occur. If this function is thwarted, society
will ultimately suffer because this method of settling conflicts will
not be considered a reliable way of obtaining justice. A more just
and probably less peaceful alternative will be preferable in the
eyes of the grievant. In other words, society needs to have confi-
dence in its legal system before the system can work.4 Society's
confidence in the legal system and the proper functioning of the
system are two sides of the same coin. Neither can exist without
the other. When lawyers act in ways which are detrimental to the
legal system, a secondary effect is that society's respect for law is
shaken. This, in turn, weakens the system more.
Preventing conduct which is detrimental to the legal system is
certainly a worthy goal. To aid in attainment of this goal, it is help-
ful to look at how this activity manifests itself. A clear instance is
violation of ethical standards which have been developed to insure
the integrity of the legal process, and it is this facet of the problem
which Professor Kalish's proposal addresses. Withholding infor-
mation in discovery is but one example of this type of harmful con-
duct.
However, some things lawyers do are clearly damaging to the
legal system and yet may not violate ethical standards. A lawyer's
ethical conduct which is not understood by the public may be de-
structive when it lessens society's confidence in the system. In-
competence, stupidity or immorality of the bar or bench also have
this effect. Constructive criticism of the legal system by those
(7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer
knows to be illegal or fraudulent.
4. The bar's recognition of the importance of society's confidence in its legal
system is reflected by the adoption of standards designed to insure that law-
yers' conduct will not undermine that confidence. E.g., ABA CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL REsPONsImmry, CANONS, No. 9 (1978); State ex rel. Nebraska State
Bar Ass'n v. Richards, 165 Neb. 80, 93, 84 N.W.2d 136, 145 (1957) ("An attorney




within it should strengthen the legal system, but public criticism
by lawyers and judges can also be viewed by laymen as a sign of
weakness. These destructive effects upon the system, while not
the evils at which a tort action for wrongful discharge is aimed, are
mentioned here for a reason. The proposal to give attorneys ten-
ure may activate these forces while aiming at another cause of the
problem. From time to time in history, society has interceded to
insure that organizations would not subvert society's best interests
by an untrammeled exercise of their power to advance the organi-
zations' self-interest. Social legislation has been enacted and judi-
cial remedies created to protect the worker, the business
competitor, the consumer and others. One does not have to be a
cynic or a reactionary to recognize that some of these necessary
and well-meant reforms have created new societal ills similar to
the ones society sought to prevent: big labor, acting in its self-in-
terest; governmental bureaucracy, acting in its self-interest; con-
sumer groups, environmental groups and other special interest
groups which may seek to advance their self-interest at the ex-
pense of society's interests. Similarly, there may be a danger that
in seeking to prevent damage to the legal system by organizations,
the wrongful discharge solution may adversely affect the legal sys-
tem and organizations which have acted properly with respect to
the system.
Professor Kalish states that his proposed solution will not pro-
tect a lawyer from being fired for some reason other than his re-
fusal to violate ethical standards, and it is not designed to limit the
employer's freedom to rid itself of incompetent professionals.
However, we cannot assume that discharged attorneys will exer-
cise the self-restraint to refuse to bring spurious lawsuits. After
all, attorneys are responsible for most of the spurious suits we
have now. Lawyers are only human. Incompetent lawyers do not
realize they are incompetent. Those who do wrong probably do
not admit it even to themselves; attorneys discharged because
their personalities are repugnant will not likely be told or realize
the reason. The natural consequence is that lawyers who are fired
for good and legitimate reasons will imagine that they have been
wronged and will search for a way to bring their case within the
wrongful discharge framework if such a remedy is available.
One effect of granting tenure to lawyers might be that an orga-
nizational employer would be hesitant to discharge an inferior at-
torney for fear of a lawsuit. Marginally competent or otherwise
inefficient attorneys would thus be insulated, rather than culled
out. The legal system would suffer from the entrenchment of prac-
titioners in employment for which they were unfit. In addition,
while there would probably not be a large volume of lawsuits
[Vol. 59:35
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brought by discharged attorneys relative to the total number of
cases, these lawyers' lawsuits would add to the burdens of an al-
ready struggling court system.
As mentioned above, a certain number of suits brought by dis-
charged attorneys would undoubtedly lack merit. In these in-
stances, the incompetents, crackpots and other undesirables of the
bar would be in the public spotlight, since these lawyers are the
most likely to be discharged, and probably the least likely to un-
derstand when they had been fired for good reason. To defend
against a frivolous lawsuit, the former employer could be expected
to present every action of the plaintiff, its former employee, in the
worst light. Moreover, an attorney who brought suit after being
discharged by a law firm would attempt to paint his former em-
ployers as somewhat less than admirable. With attorneys on ei-
ther side trying to discredit the attorney on the other side, the
worst aspects of law practice and the worst elements of the bar
would be most visible to the public, despite the fact that these are
the rare exceptions and not the rule. Before we air our dirtiest
laundry in public view, we should carefully weigh whether the
benefits which might accrue would make this price worth paying.
IhI. LIMITED TENURE AS A MEANS TO SECURE THE
INTEGRITY OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
In order for the proposed tort of wrongful discharge to help in-
sure the integrity of the legal system, it must attack a cause of the
problem. The proposal to grant tenure to lawyers is based on a
premise that lawyers who are employed by organizations are
under pressure from their employers to act in the organizations'
interest rather than ethically: in society's interest. The discovery
process is one area where ethical violations can and do occur, and
it is probable that some such violations are the employer's idea.
Nevertheless, there is reason to suppose that organizational em-
ployers are not a significant cause of ethical violations.
On balance, organizations' management is made up of people
who are probably no more corrupt than their nonorganizational
counterparts. Sometimes they may act in the interest of the organ-
ization and at society's expense, but we know they often do not. In
the discovery context, we know that the "smoking pistol" is often
produced when requested, even when the consequences are dire
to the organization. Organizations, too, act altruistically, decently
and fairly, for no other reason than it is recognized as the right
thing to do by the altruistic, decent and fair people within the or-
ganization.
A second reason, complementing the first, that organizations
act in ethical ways and want their attorneys to do so, is the fear of
19801
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exposure of unethical conduct. It is easier to do the honorable
thing if we know the less honorable thing will be discovered and
punished.5 Organizations in litigation often have much to lose if
caught in a lie; thus, even a small risk of the discovery of wrongdo-
ing is not worth running. Withholding discovery materials is prob-
ably considered frequently,. and rejected.
It cannot be denied, however, that there are violations of discov-
ery rules and other ethical standards by lawyers representing or
employed by organizations. If these violations might be curtailed
by instituting a right to sue for wrongful discharge, at least there
would be fewer ethical infractions and the system would be better
off. But this argument is based on two doubtful assumptions. One
is that a lawyer who acts unethically at his employer's command
would act differently if there were a tort of wrongful discharge; the
other is that the organizational employer is the motivating force
behind the violation in the first place.
In some instances an organization probably does pressure its
lawyers into acting in unethical ways. Some attorneys, on the
other hand, undoubtedly resist such influences to the point that
they are discharged or forced to withdraw unless the organiza-
tional employer is convinced that the lawyer's ethical solution to
the problem is preferable. Yet it seems unlikely that the first law-
yer, who lacks the courage of his convictions, would gain the cour-
age to resist the organization because of the assurance that he
would be free to take on a corporate giant or his former law firm in
litigation, and have his professional reputation shredded by a de-
fense of justifiable discharge in the bargain.
Most attorneys, it is hoped, would refuse an order which would
violate ethical standards. Presumably, such a person would refuse
regardless of whether a possible remedy of wrongful discharge ac-
tion existed; tenure is not needed to ensure this group's adherence
to the canons of ethics. There might be a deterrent effect acting
upon an organization if it realized that its insistence on unethical
behavior would result in a lawsuit against the organization. It is
doubtful, however, that such a deterrent would be effective against
an organization which was not deterred by the knowledge that its
attorney would report the violation if it occurred, even after the
lawyer's discharge or withdrawal.6
5. For example, in the discovery area sanctions are available for refusal or fail-
ure to make discovery, including award of the movant's expenses, consider-
ing the refused information to be an adverse admission, foreclosing the
presentation of claims, or contempt of court citation. FED. R. Crv. P. 37. See
also note 2 supra.
6. ABA CODE OF PROFESSiONAL RESPONSIBILY, CANONS, DR 7-102(B) (1978) re-




It seems unlikely, then, that the availability of a cause of action
for wrongful discharge would cause many lawyers or organizations
to act differently than they do presently, when faced with a conflict
between professional ethics and the organization's self-interest.
Beyond that, the proposed tort of wrongful discharge would not be
effective in promoting the integrity of the profession because most
violations of ethical standards are not caused by an organization's
coercion of its attorney.7
It is convenient for the legal profession, concerned with its in-
tegrity and that of the legal system, to shift the blame to a vague
and impersonal concept such as "the organization." However, in
the common situation the attorney who violates an ethical stan-
dard does so of his own volition for a simple reason: he wants to
win.8 Beginning with the first day of law school, the legal profes-
sion is litigious, competitive, argumentative and adversarial. The
advocate's duty in the adversary system is to press every legal ad-
vantage for the client's benefit.
Every lawyer knows that to be effective, one must believe in the
cause he advocates. Since the facts in any given case are seldom
clear, the advocate adopts the version most to his liking.9 It is pos-
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that-
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpe-
trated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly
call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client
refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to
the affected person or tribunal, except when the informa-
tion is protected as a privileged communication.
(2) A person other than his client has perpetrated a fraud
upon a tribunal shall promptly reveal the fraud to the tri-
bunal.
See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILn, CANoNs, DR 1-102
(A) (4), (5); DR 4-101(C) (2) (1978).
7. For example, in the instance described in note 2 supra, the defendant's attor-
ney who suppressed documents was apparently acting on his own, not at his
client's direction.
8. In K. HEGLAND, TRIAL AND PRACTICE SKILS 153-55 (1978), the author cites two
examples of this phenomenon from his clinical classes in trial advocacy at the
University of Arizona: "The students had no clients, had no causes. They
knew that they had been arbitrarily assigned to one hypothetical side. With
nothing to gain other than personal victory, they were willing to engage in
highly questionable behavior." Id. at 155.
9. Professor Hegland calls the desire to win a "distorting influence" upon begin-
ning lawyers in their interviews of clients:
Many beginners simply want to win. They overlook the negative
aspects of their client's case. The desires of the lawyer and client
dangerously merge. The client wants to tell a winning story. In al-
most all cases he will be reluctant to disclose unfavorable material.
In some cases, he will fudge truth and manufacture falsehood. Too
often the client is aided and abetted in this by the lawyer. Wanting
to hear a winning story, the lawyer, consciously or unconsciously,
1980]
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sible to ignore the facts favorable to the other side, to discount the
equity of the opponent's position.
For these reasons and others, some lawyers are able to rational-
ize unethical conduct, overlooking their duty to the legal system
out of their desire to win. When this is the motivation, to act un-
ethically, as it frequently is, the tort of wrongful discharge does not
provide a solution to the problem.
IV. CONCLUSION
It does not appear that the proposal to provide attorneys with a
limited form of tenure would contribute to the integrity of the legal
system. It is doubtful that organizations which retain or employ
legal counsel play a significant role in causing attorneys to violate
professional standards of ethical conduct. In instances where an
organization does attempt to influence its attorney to violate ethi-
cal standards, it seems doubtful that an attorney would react dif-
ferently to such influences if a cause of action for wrongful
discharge were provided.
Probably the major reason ethical violations occur is not be-
cause of organizational pressure on the attorney. It is the advo-
cate's natural desire to win, magnified by certain features of the
adversarial process, which makes a basically honest lawyer sup-
press unfavorable information in the discovery process or commit
other ethical violations. The tort of wrongful discharge, which
aims at the organization rather than its attorney, does not address
the problem's primary cause.
One beneficial effect would result by allowing a cause of action
for wrongful discharge of an attorney. Attorneys who have the
courage to refuse their employers' demands to engage in unethical
conduct are currently without a remedy. It is doubtful, however,
that many lawyers have suffered this injustice. Any benefit of al-
lowing the action would be outweighed by the adverse effects of
the action on the legal system. Aside from protecting second rate
attorneys from discharge and adding to already overcrowded court
calendars, allowance of the action would result in spurious law-
suits by the least desirable members of the bar. Public confidence
in the legal system would be lessened by emphasizing the faults of
may lead the client to a more agreeable version of the facts. Even
where the lawyer is not an active participant in this twisting of his-
torical fact, the desire to win may well still his rescue of it. He will
allow the client to stay at the level of vague generalities and conclu-
sions rather than forcing him to deal at the level of inconvenient fact.
When he sees a contradiction, the lawyer will brush it aside and
quickly forget it rather than confronting the client.
K. HEGLAND, supra note 8, at 206-07.
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these lawyers while the virtues of the qualified practitioners who
comprise the majority of the bar would remain submerged from
public attention.
This essay concludes that the proposed tort of wrongful dis-
charge will not improve or repair our system; it is feared that it
may harm it. Yet it is much easier to criticize a bold and new idea
than it is to suggest a better one. There are problems with our le-
gal system which need correction. Only by initiating a dialogue, as
Professor Kalish has done, will we move closer to their resolution.
The reasons for flaws in the legal system, as in society, are com-
plex and manifold. There is no panacea which will insure the in-
tegrity of the system. It is to the bar's credit that it exerts a
continuous, multi-faceted effort toward improvement of the legal
process. This long-term commitment is necessary in order to real-
ize beneficial results.
The measures already undertaken are steps in the right direc-
tion. Education of laymen concerning the tenets of the legal sys-
tem, continuing legal education of the bar to insure the
competence of its members, and revision and rigorous enforce-
ment of disciplinary standards are all well suited to the task of in-
suring the integrity of the legal system. But one ingredient is
essential to the health of the legal system: every prospective mem-
ber of the bar must learn, and every lawyer must know, that he or
she is the guardian of the integrity of the legal system. When each
one of us accepts that responsibility, the integrity of the legal sys-
tem will be assured.
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